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ABSTRACT The two ofﬁcial measures of U.S. economic output, gross
domestic product (GDP) and gross domestic income (GDI), have shown
markedly different business cycle ﬂuctuations over the past 25 years, with GDI
showing a more pronounced cycle than GDP. This paper reports a broad range
of results that indicate that GDI better reﬂects the business cycle ﬂuctuations
in true output growth. Results on revisions to the estimates, and correlations
with numerous other cyclically sensitive variables, are particularly favorable
to GDI. The most recent GDI data show the 2007–09 downturn to have been
considerably worse than is reﬂected in GDP.
T
he Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) produces two conceptually
identical ofﬁcial measures of U.S. economic output, currently called
gross domestic product (GDP) and gross domestic income (GDI). These
two measures have shown markedly different business cycle ﬂuctuations
over the past 25 years, with GDI showing a more pronounced cycle than
GDP. These differences have become particularly glaring over the latest
cyclical downturn, which appears considerably worse along several dimen-
sions when measured by GDI. The aim of this paper is to determine which
measure better represents the actual business cycle ﬂuctuations in output
growth. A wide variety of results suggest the answer is GDI.
Confusion about the information content of the two sets of estimates
often starts with the nomenclature. “GDP” can mean either the true output
variable of interest or an estimate of that output variable based on the
expenditure approach—two very different things. Furthermore, since GDI
has a different name than GDP, it may not be initially clear that GDI mea-
sures the same concept as GDP using the equally valid income approach.
To keep things straight, this paper refers to the true variable of interest as
true output, to the expenditure-side estimate of true output as GDP(E), and
to the income-side estimate of true output as GDP(I).
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estimates (those available three months after the end of the quarter) and the
later estimates that have passed through more revisions. After presenting
in section I some basic facts about the estimates, I discuss in section II the
initial growth rate estimates and present numerous results favoring GDP(I)
as the more accurate measure of output growth. First, there is some evidence
that initial GDP(I) growth predicts revisions to GDP(E) growth, and no
evidence of any tendency for GDP(E) growth to predict revisions to GDP(I)
growth. Second, initial GDP(I) growth is the better predictor of a wide
variety of business cycle indicators that should be correlated with true
output growth. These include all measures of output growth in subsequent
periods, the change in the unemployment rate in the current and subsequent
periods, employment growth (measured using a household survey) in the
current and subsequent periods, the Institute for Supply Management’s
Purchasing Managers’ Index for manufacturing in the current and subsequent
periods, changes in stock prices over previous periods, the slope of the
Treasury yield curve in previous periods, and forecasts of GDP(E) growth
itself from previous periods. Each of these results suggests that GDP(E)
growth either is the noisier measure of true output growth or misses ﬂuctu-
ations in true output growth that appear in both GDP(I) growth and the
other business cycle indicators. Third, initial GDP(I) growth has identiﬁed
the onset of each of the last few cyclical downturns more quickly than
initial GDP(E).
Section III discusses the latest revised growth rate estimates. I first
establish some basic facts about the discrepancies between the fully revised
estimates. On average, GDP(I) tends to grow faster than GDP(E) when the
economy is expanding robustly, and to lag behind GDP(E) in recessions
and in periods when the economy is sluggish. Because of this tendency, the
statistical discrepancy between the two output measures is highly negatively
correlated with the business cycle. Why is this the case? A thorough analysis
of the nature of the source data suggests that GDP(E) misses part of the
business cycle and that GDP(I) captures the business cycle better. Statistical
analyses reach the same conclusion. First, the nature of the revisions sug-
gests that they add cyclical variation to GDP(I) that is not added to GDP(E),
implying that GDP(E) misses some cyclical variation. And second, the latest
GDP(I) growth estimates are more highly correlated with a wide range of
business cycle indicators, including changes in unemployment, the growth
rate of employment, purchasing manager surveys (both manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing), changes in stock prices over previous periods, the slope
of the Treasury yield curve in previous periods, the spread between high-
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variables for ofﬁcially identiﬁed recessions.
Section IV discusses the behavior of the estimates over the most recent
cyclical downturn. When measured by GDP(I), output decelerated sooner,
fell at a faster rate at the height of the downturn, and recovered less quickly.
Drawing on the results from the previous sections and the online appendices,
1
this section discusses how GDP(E) may have missed the severity of the
downturn. Section V concludes with some thoughts about the implications
of the results for both data users and the BEA.
I. Basic Facts about the Estimates
The BEA’s ﬁrst GDP(E) estimate for the most recent quarter, called the
“advance” estimate, is released about a month after the quarter closes.
Estimates of most components of GDP(I) for that quarter are included in
the advance release, but not all of them; corporate proﬁts and net income
from the rest of the world are not released at that time. Those components
and GDP(I) are ﬁrst reported in the second release, about two months after
the quarter ends, except for estimates for the fourth quarters, when GDP(I)
ﬁrst appears with the third release, about three months after the quarter
ends. To work with a complete time series of the initial growth rates, I
focus on these third-release estimates. However, in an online appendix,
I repeat the regression results in section II using the second-release esti-
mates for quarters where an estimate of GDP(I) is available and, alter-
natively, using my own advance GDP(I) estimates constructed using the
available income-side components and forecasts of corporate proﬁts and
net income from the rest of the world.
Estimates of GDP(E) and GDP(I) growth continue to be revised after
the third release. Table 1 shows the variances of the initial (third-release)
estimates and the latest estimates, which have passed through more revisions,
as well as the correlations between the two estimates; here and throughout
the paper ΔGDP(E) and ΔGDP(I) stand for the annualized quarterly growth
rates of output implied by the estimates. I focus on two samples here. The
first starts in 1978Q3 and is dictated by the start date of the time series
of third-release growth rates employed in the paper, which is based on a
real-time dataset constructed by the BEA starting in 1978. When analyz-
ing the latest revised estimates, I focus on a shorter sample starting in the
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1. Online appendices for all papers in this issue may be found on the Brookings Papers
webpage (www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea), under “Conferences and Papers.”
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stark and highly cyclical over this period.
2 This second sample ends in
2006Q4 to ensure that the latest estimates have been revised to fully incor-
porate all their major annual source data. Figure 1 plots both ΔGDP(E) and
ΔGDP(I) from the mid-1980s to the present.
The top two panels of table 1 show that the correlations of the initial
estimates of ΔGDP(E) and ΔGDP(I) with the latest estimates of the same
measures are fairly high: 0.85 and 0.82, respectively, for the ﬁrst sample, and
0.68 and 0.66 for the second. Nonetheless, the revisions do change the
estimates in important ways. First, the bottom panel shows that the variance
of the revisions is somewhat larger in both samples for ΔGDP(I) than for
ΔGDP(E). Moreover, the revisions tend to increase the variance of ΔGDP(I)
more than the variance of ΔGDP(E). This suggests that the revisions add
information to the latest ΔGDP(I) that is not added to the latest ΔGDP(E).
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2. The start date chosen here is the econometric breakpoint marking the beginning of the
once widely accepted phenomenon known as the Great Moderation. The precise start date is
not particularly important, however; any start date around the mid-1980s gives similar results
for the latest estimates.
Table 1. Correlations between and Variances of Initial and Latest Available Estimates
of Growth in GDP(E) and GDP(I)a
Initial Initial Latest Latest 
Measure ΔGDP(E) ΔGDP(I) ΔGDP(E) ΔGDP(I)
Correlations, 1978Q3–2009Q3
Initial ΔGDP(E) 1.00
Initial ΔGDP(I) 0.95 1.00
Latest ΔGDP(E) 0.85 0.81 1.00
Latest ΔGDP(I) 0.77 0.82 0.79 1.00
Correlations, 1984Q3–2006Q4
Initial ΔGDP(E) 1.00
Initial ΔGDP(I) 0.90 1.00
Latest ΔGDP(E) 0.68 0.61 1.00
Latest ΔGDP(I) 0.63 0.66 0.60 1.00
Variances 1978Q3–2009Q3 1984Q3–2006Q4
Initial estimates 8.53 8.90 3.88 3.89
Latest estimates 9.44 10.29 4.23 4.96
Revisions (difference 2.78 3.60 2.57 3.05
between latest and 
initial estimates)
Source: Author’s calculations using BEA data.
a. “Initial” estimates are those in the third BEA release for each quarter.





Source: Author’s calculations using BEA data. 
a. Quarterly data, annualized. 
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Figure 1. Initial and Latest Available Estimates of Growth in Real GDP(E) and GDP(I),
1984Q3–2009Q3
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measures less similar, reducing their correlation from 0.90 to 0.60 in the
shorter sample.
Given the important differences between the latest estimates of GDP(E)
and GDP(I), this paper investigates two questions. First, what is the relative
information content of the initial estimates of ΔGDP(E) and ΔGDP(I)? Put
differently, how much weight should one place on each of these initial esti-
mates? Second, what is the relative information content of the estimated
GDP(E) and GDP(I) growth rates after they have passed through all their
revisions? In other words, how much weight should one place on each of
these latest, revised growth rates?
Online appendix A provides more background information about GDP(E)
and GDP(I). Appendix B discusses the source data used to construct the
initial growth rates, and appendix C describes the source data incorporated
at the annual and the benchmark revisions.
II. The Information Content of 
the Initially Estimated Growth Rates
A detailed examination of the source data used to compute the initial
(third-release) growth rates of GDP(E) and GDP(I) shows that both esti-
mates suffer from similar types of measurement error problems (see
online appendix B). These problems include missing data for a substan-
tial portion of each estimate, sampling errors, and nonsampling errors
such as incomplete coverage, survey nonresponse, and incomplete cor-
rections for firm births and deaths. A compelling case for the superiority
of either estimate cannot be made from such a detailed examination of
source data, so this section proceeds immediately to the more informa-
tive statistical tests.
3
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3. In his comment on this paper, Steven Landefeld suggests that for the third-release
estimates, a much greater fraction of GDP(I) than of GDP(E) is based on judgmental trends
instead of early source data. Almost all of the source data used to compute the third-release
estimates are ﬂawed and unrepresentative in some way, and breaking down the data using
such a binary classiﬁcation scheme is a highly subjective exercise. The detailed discussion of
the source data in online appendix B suggests that the evidence is less favorable to GDP(E)
than this classiﬁcation scheme suggests. Moreover, if a much greater fraction of GDP(I) were
based on trends, one should expect third-release ΔGDP(I) to be much less variable than third-
release ΔGDP(E), because trends should have less variance than the actual source data. The
summary statistics in table 1 show that this is not the case: third-release ΔGDP(I) is actually
slightly more variable than third-release ΔGDP(E).
12178-02a_Nalewaik_rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:10 PM  Page 76Table 2 reports the main regression results examining the information
content of the initial growth rate estimates. A good place to start is by
examining the power of the initial estimates to predict the latest estimates,
which incorporate superior source data. Over the full sample, the initial
ΔGDP(E) estimates predict well the latest estimates of ΔGDP(E), with ini-
tial ΔGDP(I) adding little after conditioning on initial ΔGDP(E). Similarly,
initial ΔGDP(I) well predicts latest ΔGDP(I), with initial ΔGDP(E) adding
little information after conditioning on initial ΔGDP(I). However, the ﬁnal
two sets of regressions in table 2 show results for a sample starting in
1994Q1; I stop this subsample in 2006Q4 to ensure that the latest estimates
have passed through all their annual revisions, but extending the subsample
to 2008Q4 produces similar results. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation constrains the
coefficients on initial ΔGDP(E) and initial ΔGDP(I) to sum to 1, whereas
the second does not; the results show that over this sample period, when
initial ΔGDP(I) is 1 percentage point above initial ΔGDP(E), initial ΔGDP(E)
has subsequently been revised upward about a third (0.28) to two-fifths
(0.42) of a percentage point, on average. Dennis Fixler and Bruce Grimm
(2006), using a broader set of conditioning variables, also ﬁnd some ten-
dency for initial ΔGDP(E) to be revised toward initial ΔGDP(I). The last set
of results shows that, over this subsample, there remains no signiﬁcant ten-
dency for initial ΔGDP(E) to predict latest ΔGDP(I).
Initial ΔGDP(I) may have predicted revisions to ΔGDP(E) in this sample
because the initial ΔGDP(I) estimates are less noisy than the initial ΔGDP(E)
estimates, or because they contain information about true output growth that
is missed by the initial ΔGDP(E) estimates but is incorporated into latest
ΔGDP(E) through revisions. Each of these explanations is likely part of the
story. Averaging the data into year-over-year growth rates eliminates much
of the noise in the quarterly data and shows the plausibility of the second
explanation. The top panel of ﬁgure 2 plots the revisions in the year-over-year
(fourth quarter to fourth quarter) growth rate of GDP(E) against the gap
between GDP(I) and GDP(E) in the initial estimated year-over-year growth
rates.
4 Broadly speaking, two periods drive the positive relationship that
emerges.
5
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4. This presentation was suggested to me by William Wascher.
5. The line plots the predicted values from regressing the 13 Q4-over-Q4 growth rates of
real GDP(E) on a constant and the gap between the initial estimates of Q4-over-Q4 GDP(I)
and GDP(E) growth. The coefﬁcient on the gap is 0.98, with a standard error of 0.44 and an
adjusted R
2 of 0.25. I also experimented with corrections that removed the effects of major
methodological changes from the revisions; this modiﬁcation increased the R
2.
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Source: Author’s calculations using BEA data. 
a. Difference between initial and latest available, fourth quarter to fourth quarter. 
b. Difference between initial ΔGDP(I) and initial ΔGDP(E), fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
c. Difference between initial ΔGDP(E) and initial ΔGDP(I), fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
Revision to ΔGDP(I) (percentage points)a
Statistical discrepancy in initial estimated growth ratesb
(percentage points)
Statistical discrepancy in initial estimated growth ratesc
(percentage points)


























Figure 2. Revisions to Output Growth Measures and the Statistical Discrepancy
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initial ΔGDP(E) was consistently positive, as the initial estimates showed
GDP(I) growing faster than GDP(E). This phenomenon was discussed in
real time by the Council of Economic Advisers (Economic Report of the
President 1997, pp. 72–74), the Federal Reserve Board (Greenspan 2004),
and the BEA itself (Moulton 2000), with conclusions generally favorable to
GDP(I). Those conclusions were later vindicated, since ultimately ΔGDP(E)
was revised upward toward initial ΔGDP(I). Initial ΔGDP(I) accurately
captured information about the brisk pace of economic growth that the
initial ΔGDP(E) estimates had missed and that was incorporated only later
through revisions (and then probably only partially; see section III). Second,
the initial estimates of ΔGDP(I) in 2002 and 2003, after the 2001 recession,
showed a more sluggish recovery than the initial estimates of ΔGDP(E), so
that the gap between the initial estimates was negative.
6Ultimately, ΔGDP(E)
was revised toward initial ΔGDP(I) again: the recovery was indeed quite
sluggish, and this information was reﬂected in ΔGDP(I) before it appeared
in ΔGDP(E). The bottom panel of ﬁgure 2, which plots revisions in the fourth
quarter–to–fourth quarter growth rate of GDP(I) against the gap between
GDP(I) and GDP(E) in the initial estimated year-over-year growth rates,
shows no tendency for ΔGDP(I) to be revised toward ΔGDP(E); if anything,
ΔGDP(I) tends to be revised in the opposite direction from the initial gap
over this period.
This particular set of revision results uses a short sample and should
therefore be taken with a grain of salt. As a robustness check, I used past
issues of the Survey of Current Business to extend the sample back in time
to 1966Q4; the results, reported in online appendix D, show a marginally
statistically signiﬁcant tendency for initial ΔGDP(E) to be revised toward
initial ΔGDP(I) over this long sample. After the data have passed through
their first annual revision, a statistically significant tendency for initial
ΔGDP(E) to be revised toward initial ΔGDP(I) in subsequent revisions
appears yet again, in regressions using the 1978Q3–2009Q3 sample. So it
would probably be unwise to ignore these revision results entirely. How-
ever, if for some reason an analyst did decide to ignore the predictability
of the revisions, then the weight that analyst should place on the initial
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6. As online appendix C outlines, since 2002 the BEA has incorporated information
from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) into its wage and salary
estimates a couple of months after its third release. These QCEW revisions provided much
of the information contained in ΔGDP(I) on the relative sluggishness of the recovery; see the
discussion in Nalewaik (2007a). The year-over-year growth rates for fourth quarters available
in real time reﬂect these QCEW revisions.
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est, fully revised estimates. An analyst who believes that latest ΔGDP(E) is
more accurate than latest ΔGDP(I) should believe that initial ΔGDP(E) is
more accurate than initial ΔGDP(I), and vice versa. So the results outlined
in the next section, addressing the paper’s second question, are also critical
to answering the ﬁrst.
However, one can make considerable further progress on the paper’s
first question directly, by examining the predictive power of the initial
estimates for other important cyclical indicators. Broadly speaking, these
regressions help establish which estimate is more informative about the
business cycle, but they also help answer the narrower question of which is
the better estimate of true output growth. The inferior estimate of true output
growth, containing relatively more noise or classic measurement error,
should have a lower signal-to-noise ratio and be the inferior predictor of
cyclical indicators correlated with true output growth, all else equal. (This
assumes that the noise in the output growth estimates is uncorrelated with
the measurement error in the other cyclical indicators, and I have chosen
the other cyclical indicators carefully to avoid this problem.) An estimate
may be inferior not only because it is noisier, but also because it misses
more ﬂuctuations in true output growth (that is, contains less news or signal
about true output growth) than the other estimate. But, again, such an infe-
rior estimate should have a lower signal-to-noise ratio and be the inferior
predictor of cyclical indicators that reﬂect those missing ﬂuctuations in
true output growth.
Returning to table 2, the top panel shows that as a cyclical indicator
of where output growth is headed, initial ΔGDP(I) is superior to initial
ΔGDP(E). The initial estimates of ΔGDP(I) are positively related to output
growth in the next quarter, whether the latter is measured by ΔGDP(E) or
ΔGDP(I), initial or latest. Conditional on initial ΔGDP(I), initial ΔGDP(E)
contains no information about output growth next quarter and may actually
be negatively related to it. This result holds two quarters ahead as well,
using either initial estimate of output growth. Following the logic outlined
above, these results may obtain because initial ΔGDP(E) is noisier than
initial ΔGDP(I), so that its signal about true output growth in subsequent
periods is obscured, or because initial ΔGDP(E), but not initial ΔGDP(I),
misses some of the shocks that produce serially correlated ﬂuctuations in
true output growth.
I examine next the relationship of the initial estimates to other cyclical
variables that should be correlated with true output growth. To avoid cor-
related measurement errors and spurious correlation, I examine only vari-
82 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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outlined in the appendices, the GDP(E) and GDP(I) estimates make little
use of the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly household survey
used to produce estimates of the unemployment rate.
7 As one of the most
important indicators of the business cycle, the unemployment rate is a good
variable to use as a starting point for this analysis.
Table 2 shows that initial ΔGDP(I) has a strong negative relationship
with the contemporaneous change in the unemployment rate and negatively
predicts changes to the unemployment rate one and two quarters ahead,
whereas the coefﬁcients on initial ΔGDP(E) are insigniﬁcant and have the
wrong sign when conditioning on initial ΔGDP(I). Again, this may be
because initial ΔGDP(E) is noisier than initial ΔGDP(I), or because initial
ΔGDP(E) misses ﬂuctuations in true output that both appear in ΔGDP(I)
and are reﬂected in the differenced unemployment rate.
The next set of regressions in table 2 shows results using quarterly
annualized employment growth computed from the household survey data,
adjusted for breaks introduced by Census updates to the population. Initial
ΔGDP(I) is positively related to employment growth this quarter, as well
as one and two quarters ahead, but initial ΔGDP(E) contains little addi-
tional information about employment growth beyond that contained in
initial ΔGDP(I).
Broadening the results beyond labor market variables, the next set of
regressions uses the PMI (formerly called the Purchasing Managers’ Index)
from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing survey.
The ISM measure is computed quite differently from GDP(E) and GDP(I).
It is an aggregation of several diffusion indexes, so that even though the
companies participating in the ISM survey also participate in the surveys
used to estimate GDP(E) and GDP(I), the measurement errors likely behave
quite differently. Initial ΔGDP(I) explains the contemporaneous, one-quarter-
ahead, and two-quarters-ahead movements in the ISM measure better than
initial ΔGDP(E), which in fact provides no statistically signiﬁcant infor-
mation conditional on initial ΔGDP(I).
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7. At ﬁrst blush, some analysts might suspect that GDP(I) must be more correlated with
the unemployment rate than GDP(E), because “income” is in the name and the unemployment
rate is a labor market concept. However, this reasoning is incorrect. Of the various components
of the two output measures, one may expect based on a priori considerations that compensation
will have a higher-than-average correlation with unemployment, but the other components
of GDP(I) should then have a lower-than-average correlation, since all the components of
GDP(I) add up to the same conceptual measure of output as GDP(E). For example, stories in
the press recently have suggested that some of the recent rebound in corporate proﬁts was
facilitated by weakness in the labor market, allowing ﬁrms to cut compensation costs.
12178-02a_Nalewaik_rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:10 PM  Page 83Business cycle analysts use a host of other variables to predict ΔGDP(E),
most notably different asset prices, and since these asset prices are not
used in constructing the output growth estimates, they are prime candi-
date variables for testing the information content of the initial estimates.
However, asset prices typically predict output growth in subsequent
quarters, rather than being predicted by output growth, so to get the tim-
ing correct, I regress lagged values of these asset prices on the two ini-
tial output growth measures. This is a somewhat odd specification but
still quite instructive. The results essentially reveal which initial esti-
mate is more consistent with market expectations of the business cycle
from earlier periods.
The ﬁrst asset-price speciﬁcation regresses the logarithm of the change
in the S&P 500 stock price index from the end of quarter t − 4 to the end
of quarter t on the two initial output growth measures in quarter t. Initial
ΔGDP(I) is strongly positively related to this measure of stock price changes,
whereas the coefﬁcient on initial ΔGDP(E) is insigniﬁcant and negative.
The next speciﬁcation examines the slope of the yield curve, measured as
the difference in yields between 10- and 2-year Treasury notes. This variable
is most closely related to the output growth measures about 2 years hence;
a regression of this measure from quarter t − 8 on the two initial output
growth measures in quarter t yields a coefﬁcient on initial ΔGDP(I) that is
signiﬁcant and has the correct (positive) sign, and a coefﬁcient on initial
ΔGDP(E) that is signiﬁcant but has the wrong sign.
The ﬁnal set of testing variables I employ consists of median forecasts
of output growth from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). These
forecasters are trying to predict initial ΔGDP(E), presumably inclusive of
any measurement errors. However, if the forecasters do not yet have access
to the source data used to compute ΔGDP(E) for the quarter they are trying
to predict, their forecasts will likely reﬂect general information about the
state of the economy, which may be better related to initial ΔGDP(I) than
to initial ΔGDP(E). This may be the case even for the current-quarter
forecasts, because the survey occurs relatively early in the quarter, before
the analysts have much GDP(E) source data. The results show that those
current-quarter forecasts are well explained by initial ΔGDP(I), with initial
ΔGDP(E) providing no incremental explanatory power. The SPF forecasts
for quarter t, made in the ﬁrst half of quarter t−1, are also better explained by
initial ΔGDP(I) in period t than by initial ΔGDP(E) in period t. Forecasters’
expectations for how the economy will move in the current quarter and the
next appear to play out more fully in the initial ΔGDP(I) estimates than in
initial ΔGDP(E).
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cycle indicators, placing full weight on the initial ΔGDP(E) estimates and
no weight on the initial ΔGDP(I) estimates necessarily implies several
things: ﬁrst, that one cares about true output growth in the current quarter
only (and not about the business cycle more broadly or even where true
output growth is headed next quarter); second, that one believes that the
latest ΔGDP(E) estimates reﬂect all available information about true output
growth, so that neither latest ΔGDP(I) nor any other variable provides any
additional marginal information about true output growth; third, that one
believes that the superior explanatory power of initial ΔGDP(I) for various
other cyclical indicators reveals nothing about the relative accuracy of
initial ΔGDP(I) and initial ΔGDP(E) as estimates of true output growth;
and fourth, that one discounts entirely the evidence contained in revisions.
Regarding the ﬁrst point, this may be a reasonable position for the BEA to
take, but for analysts it is less clear: true output growth may be the only
variable of interest for some purposes, but not for others. The dismissal of
initial ΔGDP(I)’s ability to predict other indicators could be justiﬁed only
if initial ΔGDP(I) contains variation uncorrelated to true output growth but
correlated with all the other dependent variables employed in table 2, includ-
ing actual forecasts of output growth. This is clearly an extreme position.
A much more plausible explanation is that initial ΔGDP(I) is more highly
correlated with true output growth than initial ΔGDP(E), and that true out-
put growth is correlated with all these other cyclical indicators. Similarly,
the view that latest ΔGDP(E) reﬂects all available information about true
output growth is quite an extreme position in favor of the accuracy of latest
ΔGDP(E), and the results in the next section suggest that latest ΔGDP(I)
does contain a considerable amount of information about true output growth
that latest ΔGDP(E) misses.
The regression results in table 2 are broadly consistent with those in
Nalewaik (2007a), where I use Markov switching models to show that
ΔGDP(I) identiﬁes cyclical turning points more quickly than ΔGDP(E) in
real time. Speciﬁcally, at the start of the 1980, 1981–82, 1990–91, and 2001
recessions (as defined by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER), real-time estimates of a
Markov switching model using ΔGDP(E) alone put the probability that the
economy was in a low-growth state at 52 percent, 40 percent, 45 percent,
and 23 percent, respectively. Substituting ΔGDP(I) in the model produced
much more accurate probabilities: 78 percent, 44 percent, 72 percent, and
70 percent. Most of the research in Nalewaik (2007a) was carried out in
2005, and the subsequent cyclical downturn was the ﬁrst out-of-sample
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performed much better around the start of the downturn in real time; it also
performed better than some popular models using monthly indicators
(see section IV).
Although this section has focused on growth rates derived from the
BEA’s third releases, the information content of growth rates calculated
from the two preceding releases is of critical importance for analysis in real
time. Online appendix D reports results for these vintages, as well as results
for the estimates once they have passed through their ﬁrst annual revision.
Brieﬂy, when an ofﬁcial second-release estimate of ΔGDP(I) is available, the
results using second-release growth rates are very similar to those reported
in this section using the third-release growth rates. And as discussed above,
the results using growth rates based on the ﬁrst annual revision are even
more favorable to ΔGDP(I) than the results using third-release growth
rates, showing a statistically signiﬁcant tendency for ΔGDP(E) to be revised
toward ΔGDP(I) over the full sample.
For the advance estimates, when an ofﬁcial ΔGDP(I) estimate is not
available, the situation is quite different. I use proﬁts data from previous
quarters and NIPA components that are reported in the advance release to
generate the proﬁts forecast used in constructing the “advance ΔGDP(I)”
examined in the online appendix. However, some companies have already
reported their quarterly proﬁts for the latest complete quarter at the time of
the advance release, and incorporating this information may produce a
much-improved “advance ΔGDP(I)” estimate. That said, these rather lim-
ited advance-release ΔGDP(I) estimates perform poorly compared with the
ofﬁcial advance-release ΔGDP(E) estimates, which better predict most of
the business cycle variables used in this section. In addition, when predict-
ing latest ΔGDP(I), about a two-thirds weight should be placed on the
advance-release ΔGDP(E), and only about a one-third weight on the con-
structed advance-release ΔGDP(I) estimates. This suggests that the initial
estimates of corporate proﬁts produced by the BEA are highly informative
and cannot be easily predicted based on lagged proﬁts or other available
NIPA variables. For fourth-quarter second-release estimates, when ofﬁcial
proﬁts numbers remain unavailable, this is presumably the case as well.
III. Information Content of the Latest Growth Rate Estimates
This section begins by showing that the latest estimates of GDP(I) and
GDP(E) exhibit markedly different cyclical properties since the mid-1980s.
I then discuss the evidence from revisions suggesting the superiority of the
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latest estimates to other cyclically sensitive variables.
III.A. The Cyclicality of the Latest Estimates
Table 1 showed that the correlation between ΔGDP(E) and ΔGDP(I)
dropped sometime around the mid-1980s, and the divergences between the
estimates became highly cyclical around that time. Figure 3 shows this using
year-over-year growth rates: GDP(I) rose faster than GDP(E) through
most of the 1990s boom and the comparatively short boom period from
2004 to 2006; in contrast, GDP(I) growth fell below GDP(E) growth in the
2001 recession and in the latest cyclical downturn. (Of course, these data
are subject to further annual and benchmark revisions.) Figure 4 plots
the statistical discrepancy between GDP(E) minus GDP(I), as a percent
of GDP(E), and the unemployment rate; work by Charles Fleischman
first examined this relationship, to my knowledge. Fleischman and John
Roberts (2010) have studied the relationships among GDP(E), GDP(I), the
unemployment rate, and other variables in the context of a state space
model of the business cycle. Their work points to the unemployment rate
as an excellent measure of the state of the business cycle; it also suggests
that GDP(E) is measured with more error than GDP(I). Figure 4 shows that
the measurement errors in either GDP(I) or GDP(E) are clearly systematically




Source: Author’s calculations using BEA data. 
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Figure 3. Year-over-Year Growth Rates of GDP(E) and GDP(I), 1985Q1–2009Q3a
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is commonly assumed.
To better understand the relationship depicted in ﬁgure 4, consider a very
simple model. In Nalewaik (2008) I showed why the type of model outlined
below is an incomplete characterization of the growth rates of GDP(E) or
GDP(I), and I proposed models that ﬁt the evidence better. However, the
model is useful for the limited purpose of framing the subsequent discussion.
Let true output be Y t *, and assume that it can be decomposed into a trend τt
and a cycle ψt, so that Y t * =τ t +ψ t. The unemployment rate Ut is governed
by an Okun’s law relationship:
Now assume that GDP(I) and GDP(E) are systematically either too cyclical
or not cyclical enough, so that:
Then the statistical discrepancy SDt = GDP(E)t − GDP(I)t = (αE −α I)ψt,











tt t −= ∗ − ( ) =< γτ γ ψ γ ,. 0
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Percent of GDP(E) Percent
Statistical discrepancy (left scale)
Unemployment rate (right scale)
Source: Author’s calculations using BEA and Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 
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Figure 4. Statistical Discrepancy between GDP(E) and GDP(I) and the Unemployment
Rate, 1984Q1–2009Q3
a
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and the unemployment rate:
The strong positive relationship shown in ﬁgure 4 then implies that αE < αI,
that is, that the magnitude of the cycle is smaller in GDP(E) than in
GDP(I). Table 3 reports regressions investigating this relationship. The
ﬁrst three regressions show that the unemployment rate captures more than
60 percent of the variability of the statistical discrepancy from 1984Q3
through 2006Q4, and although the discrepancy is highly autocorrelated,
the unemployment rate remains signiﬁcant when an AR1 term is added. The
last three columns of table 3 show specifications in first differences, to
isolate the higher-frequency variation in the data. The first difference
exhibits some negative autocorrelation, but the coefficient on the differ-
enced unemployment rate remains positive, and the relationship is highly
signiﬁcant when the differenced unemployment rate is lagged one quarter.
These regression results confirm that the statistical discrepancy is not
noise, even in differences.
Having established that αE < αI within the context of this very stylized
model, three possibilities can be considered:
—Both GDP(I) and GDP(E) are more cyclical than true output, so that
αI > αE > 1. In this case GDP(E) represents the cycle in true output better
than GDP(I).
—Both GDP(I) and GDP(E) are less cyclical than true output, so that
αE < αI < 1. In this case GDP(I) represents the cycle in true output better
than GDP(E).
—GDP(E) is less cyclical and GDP(I) is more cyclical than true out-
put, so that αE < 1 < αI. In this case GDP(I) represents the cycle in true
output better than GDP(E) if αI − 1 < 1 −α E.
These possibilities frame the detailed discussion of the source data
incorporated into the latest estimates in online appendix C. Plenty of evi-
dence suggests that GDP(E) misses part of the business cycle, implying
that the first possibility is unlikely. Some of the construction compo-
nents of GDP(E) are smoothed; in particular, the additions and alterations
(“adds and alts”) component of residential structures is smoothed using a
3-year moving average. This is problematic, because smoothed estimates
inherently understate the magnitude of business cycle accelerations and
decelerations. Although “adds and alts” is a small component of GDP(E),
it may have taken on outsized importance in the late-2000s downturn and
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12178-02a_Nalewaik_rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:10 PM  Page 90may have contributed to some of the ﬂuctuations in the discrepancy around
the 1990–91 recession.
Probably more important, over most of this sample the type of annual
surveys used to compute the goods-producing sector of GDP(E) simply
did not exist for most of the (enormous) services-producing sector. As a
consequence the BEA was forced to cobble together estimates based on
trade-source, administrative, and regulatory data, which may have missed
part of the business cycle. For example, these data sources may miss ﬂuc-
tuations in the output of sole proprietors and some small businesses, both
of which are highly cyclical. And the activities of many types of ﬁnancial
services companies or entities may have been missed by the regulatory data
used by the BEA to compute personal consumption expenditures (PCE)
for ﬁnancial services. The magnitude of the booms and busts in ﬁnancial
services, then, may not be fully reﬂected in the PCE component of GDP(E)
or exports of services. However, many of these ﬁrms and entities likely did
ﬁle tax forms, so their activities would have been represented in the tax
data used to compute GDP(I). This could explain part of the increase in the
statistical discrepancy in 1989, 2001, and the latest episode.
Online appendix C also discusses potential reasons why GDP(I) might
be too cyclical. It is possible that some capital gains, which should be
excluded from the BEA’s definition of output, were misreported to the
Internal Revenue Service as ordinary income and thus included in the tax
data used to compute GDP(I). Capital gains are likely to be highly pro-
cyclical, so failure to exclude them could have made GDP(I) more cyclical
than true output. Although the evidence on this is thin, the third possibility
above might be slightly more likely than the second. However, the evidence
in favor of GDP(E) understating the cycle is stronger than the evidence in
favor of GDP(I) overstating the cycle, so if the third possibility holds, it is
probably the case that αI − 1 < 1 −α E.
Columns 3-4 through 3-6 of table 3 show that the statistical discrepancy
is much less cyclical before the mid-1980s. Why might that be the case?
Although PCE for services has always been a relatively large share of
GDP(E), averaging 30 percent from 1947 to 1984, its share shot up to an
average of 43 percent from 1985 to 2009 and reached 48 percent in 2009.
As the share of services PCE has increased, the measurement problems in
GDP(E) may have become more severe and more plainly visible. In addition,
booms and busts in ﬁnancial services may have accounted for a much larger
share of the variability of the business cycle since the mid-1980s, a period
that includes the junk bond boom and bust (as well as the savings and loan
boom and bust) from the mid- to late 1980s, the day-trading boom in the
JEREMY J. NALEWAIK 91
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and the mortgage securitization boom and bust from 2002 to 2008. GDP(E)
may have missed much of this variation. But whatever the reason, since
the really interesting divergences between the latest estimates occur in the
post-1984Q3 period, the remainder of this section focuses on this sample.
III.B. Information in the Revisions about the Latest Estimates
Consider the following hypothetical example. Two time series estimate
the same unobserved variable of interest. The two time series happen to be
identical, but they are known to be subject to considerable measurement
error and may deviate widely from the true variable of interest. Suppose
new information becomes available that leads to large revisions to one of
the estimates, bringing it closer to the truth, while the other estimate remains
unrevised. Which estimate is now better? Obviously, the estimate that was
revised is better: it is now clear that it was far off initially and that the revi-
sions corrected some or all of that measurement error, and that the estimate
that was not revised remains far off. More generally, if two estimates start out
identical, or reasonably close, and the revisions improve both estimates,
then the estimate that is revised more will, on average, tend to be better
than the estimate that is revised less. This is the underlying logic of Fixler
and Nalewaik (2007). Table 1 shows that the initial estimates of ΔGDP(I) and
ΔGDP(E) do start out with a very high correlation, but ΔGDP(I) is revised
more. Although the evidence in section II suggests that ΔGDP(I) starts out
as the better estimate, if one makes the relatively uncontroversial assumption
that the revisions improve the estimates, then the larger revisions imply
that ΔGDP(I) has expanded its lead. Fixler and Nalewaik (2007) use this
revisions evidence to establish bounds on the optimal weights to be placed
on ΔGDP(I) and ΔGDP(E), and the bounds are favorable to ΔGDP(I).
The revisions increase the variance of ΔGDP(I) more than the variance of
ΔGDP(E), implying that they add some news, or actual variation in true out-
put growth, to ΔGDP(I) that is not added to ΔGDP(E) (see Mankiw, Runkle,
and Shapiro 1984, Mankiw and Shapiro 1986, and Fixler and Nalewaik
2007). This variation in true output growth missed by latest ΔGDP(E) and
captured by latest ΔGDP(I) is closely related to the business cycle. In partic-
ular, Nalewaik (2007b) shows that the revisions tend to reduce ΔGDP(I) by
more than they reduce ΔGDP(E) in low-growth states, so the extent of the
weakness of true output growth in low-growth states appears to be part of
the information missing from ΔGDP(E) but appearing in ΔGDP(I) through
its more informative revisions. Since this weakness in low-growth states
appears in neither initial estimate and remains missing in latest ΔGDP(E),
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in latest ΔGDP(I) must damage the estimates. More broadly, any sugges-
tion that latest ΔGDP(E) is better than latest ΔGDP(I) would seem to imply
that the variability added to ΔGDP(I) through the revisions moves it 
further away from true output growth. This seems hard to believe and, if
carried to its logical conclusion, implies that the BEA should stop revising
ΔGDP(I) and allocate its resources elsewhere. I do not think anyone at the
BEA would seriously advocate taking that step. In contrast, the standard
interpretation of the revisions is less problematic for the BEA: the revisions
improve both ΔGDP(E) and ΔGDP(I), but the source data incorporated into
ΔGDP(E) are simply not as informative as the source data incorporated in
ΔGDP(I). But in that case, latest ΔGDP(I) is likely the better estimate.
III.C. Relationship to Other Business Cycle Variables
The logic behind the tests reported in table 4 is similar to the logic behind
the regression results in table 2, but the table switches the regression order
and reports results from pairs of regressions, one regressing latest ΔGDP(I)
and one regressing latest ΔGDP(E) on each cyclical indicator. The R
2s in the
second and third columns show that latest ΔGDP(I) is more highly correlated
with every one of these cyclical indicators. Online appendix D repeats this
exercise using annual instead of quarterly data, and the results are quite
similar.
8 ΔGDP(I) is more highly correlated with lagged stock price changes,
the lagged slope of the yield curve, and the lagged spread between high-
yield corporate bonds and Treasury bonds (using a somewhat shortened
sample).
9 It is more highly correlated with short and long differences of
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8. Much of the source data incorporated at annual revisions are at an annual frequency,
with no information on quarterly patterns, so the quarterly numbers are likely less reliable
than the annual. For example, BEA analysts are conﬁdent that employee gains from exercising
nonqualiﬁed stock options net out of the annual GDP(I) estimates (since proﬁts fall by the
same amount as the increase in compensation), but they are concerned that the quarterly
pattern within years may be distorted (see Moylan 2008).
9. In his comment, Steven Landefeld suggests that stock market ﬂuctuations may be more
highly correlated with ΔGDP(I), because capital gains may be “leaking” into ΔGDP(I). If this
is the case, the correlation between changes in stock prices and ΔGDP(I) should be contempo-
raneous, especially at an annual frequency, since a rising stock market translates immediately
into a capital gain. Online appendix D shows that the evidence does not support this: using the
annual output growth measures, ΔGDP(E) is slightly more highly correlated with the contem-
poraneous change in the stock market, whereas ΔGDP(I) is more highly correlated with the
stock market change from one year earlier. The evidence is more suggestive of either the stock
market anticipating changes in true output, or changes in the stock market affecting true out-
put with a lag, with true output better represented by ΔGDP(I). See also Nalewaik (2008).
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Independent variable GDP(I)t GDP(E)t GDP(I)t GDP(E)t are equal












Treasury (7yr) b 0.18 0.06 −0.54 −0.30 0.00
(0.16) (0.15)
rt−8
Treasury (10yr) − rt−8
Treasury (2yr) 0.05 0.01 0.70 0.36 0.02
(0.37) (0.38)
(URt − URt−1) × 4 0.26 0.24 −1.47 −1.32 0.40
(0.27) (0.30)
URt − URt−4 0.25 0.10 −1.74 −1.04 0.00
(0.29) (0.32)
URt+2 − URt−2 0.35 0.21 −2.19 −1.59 0.02
(0.28) (0.34)
















household 0.23 0.18 1.14 0.93 0.13
(0.23) (0.20)
ISMt
manuf. 0.33 0.19 0.29 0.20 0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
ISMt
nonmanuf. c 0.29 0.18 0.33 0.24 0.20
(0.08) (0.05)
Recession dummies 0.29 0.24 −5.05 −4.28 0.46
(0.43) (0.77)
Source: Author’s regressions using BEA data.
a. The sample period is 1984Q3–2006Q4 except where noted otherwise. Newey-West standard errors
with eight lags are in parentheses.
b. The sample period is 1988Q3–2006Q4.
c. The sample period is 1997Q3–2006Q4.
Adjusted R2
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same holds true for the household survey measure of employment growth.
Recall that there is no reason to suspect these measures to be spuriously
correlated with ΔGDP(I). ΔGDP(I) is more highly correlated with the
manufacturing ISM index and, when a shorter sample is used, with the
nonmanufacturing ISM index as well. It is also more highly correlated with
dummies for NBER recessions (see also Nalewaik 2007a).
10
As in table 2, latest ΔGDP(I) may be more highly correlated with all
these variables because latest ΔGDP(E) is contaminated with more noise.
But the interpretation of the revisions offered in the previous subsection
suggests a second type of measurement error, namely, that latest ΔGDP(E)
misses variation in true output growth that appears in all these cyclical
indicators and is picked up by latest ΔGDP(I). No matter which type of
measurement error drives the results, latest ΔGDP(I) is the better estimate of
true output growth. For the more econometrically oriented reader, how-
ever, the table provides formal tests derived in Nalewaik (2008) that dif-
ferentiate between the two types of measurement error. The tests reject
the hypothesis that the second type of error, called lack of signal error
(LoSE) in Nalewaik (2008), does not contaminate latest ΔGDP(E).
Regressions are run of each estimate on a testing variable, under the main-
tained assumption that the testing variable captures some of the variation
missing from one estimate but included in the other. Nalewaik (2008)
shows that the LoSE biases the regression coefﬁcient on the testing vari-
able toward zero, so the regression using the estimate that contains more
LoSE yields a coefﬁcient closer to zero. Note that it is measurement error
of the LoSE form in the dependent variable that causes this attenuation
bias, precisely the opposite of the conventional wisdom about classic
measurement error, namely, that it is measurement error in the explana-
tory variable that causes attenuation bias. Testing the equality of the coef-
ﬁcients on the testing variable across the two regressions, Nalewaik
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10. Note that these (often substantially higher) correlations are evidence against the
crude model outlined in section III.A. In that model ΔGDP(E) and ΔGDP(I) contain rescaled
versions of the same business cycle ﬂuctuations, in which case the R
2 must be equal across
the two regressions. That is clearly not the case: ΔGDP(I) contains different business cycle
ﬂuctuations, which also show up in these other business cycle variables. Nalewaik (2008) uses
essentially this same argument to reject a crude rescaling model in favor of the LoSE model;
see below. Nevertheless, both the LoSE model and the rescaling model say the same thing,
broadly speaking: GDP(E) growth misses some of the business cycle ﬂuctuations in true out-
put growth, which show up in GDP(I) growth as well as in other variables.
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speciﬁcations of table 4, using a slightly different sample. Under the
maintained assumption, ΔGDP(I) contains more signal about true output
growth than ΔGDP(E)—signal that is reﬂected in stock and bond prices.
Table 4 shows that this missing signal also appears in the differenced
unemployment rate, household survey employment growth, and the ISM
measures. The coefﬁcients in table 4 are all larger, in absolute value,
when ΔGDP(I) is the dependent variable; a relatively large amount of
noise in ΔGDP(E) cannot explain these results, but a relatively large
amount of LoSE can.
Less formal comparisons of GDP(E) and GDP(I) with other sources
of information about the business cycle are also informative. In particular,
one can compare the peaks and troughs in GDP(E) and GDP(I) with the
NBER peak and trough dates. Grimm (2005) does this; ﬁgure 5 shows the
results graphically for the three recessions before the most recent one.
The one case where GDP(I) suggests a different dating than the NBER’s
is the 1990–91 recession: GDP(I) starts declining during the NBER peak
quarter whereas GDP(E) is ﬂat, but since the monthly peak was July 1990,
the 1990Q3 GDP(I) decline seems consistent with the NBER dating. In the
1981–82 recession, the NBER called the trough in 1982Q4, the same quar-
ter as the trough in GDP(I), whereas GDP(E) calls the trough three quar-
ters earlier. In the 2001 recession it is difﬁcult to discern any real cyclical
downturn in GDP(E), whereas the NBER peak and trough dates line up
perfectly with those of GDP(I). These peak and trough dates summarize
the information in several other reliable indicators, and the fact that they
line up better with GDP(I) is again suggestive that GDP(I) is the better
estimate.
IV. The Estimates over the 2007–09 Cyclical Downturn
The recent downturn looks considerably worse when output is measured
using GDP(I) instead of GDP(E). Several differences can be cited. First, the
effect on output appears sooner in GDP(I), which shows a sharp deceleration
even before the NBER peak in late 2007. This deceleration was somewhat
evident in the real-time estimates of GDP(I), but more important, the reces-
sion itself was much more evident in the real-time estimates of GDP(I) than
in the real-time estimates of GDP(E). Second, the steepness of the plunge in
output in late 2008 and early 2009 appears worse in the GDP(I) estimates.
And third, with the BEA’s February 2010 data release, the decline in output
now appears more prolonged, extending into the summer of 2009.
96 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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Index, business cycle peak = 100
1981–82
Source: Author’s calculations using BEA data. 
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Figure 5. GDP(E) and GDP(I) in Three Recessions
a
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dates, indexing them to 2006Q1 because the initial levels of the two series
are different and have changed with revisions. The estimates released in
March 2008, shortly after the start of the recession, both trend upward at a
similar pace through 2006 and the ﬁrst half of 2007 but then diverge con-
siderably. GDP(I) shows the economy in a much more vulnerable state
in late 2007, with output essentially flat over the second half of the year.
GDP(E) shows little of this vulnerability in the second half; although
growth was weak in 2007Q4, that weakness came on the heels of estimated
annualized growth of almost 5 percent in 2007Q3.
11
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11. At the end of March 2008, the bivariate Markov switching model using ΔGDP(I) in
Nalewaik (2007a) estimated a probability of around 90 percent that the economy had down-
shifted to a low-growth state by 2007Q4, and this probability remained well above 50 per-
cent throughout 2008. At the same time, a Markov switching model using ΔGDP(E) alone
estimated a probability of less than 20 percent that the economy had downshifted to a low-
growth state, a probability that remained low through most of 2008 (for example, it was
27 percent at the end of September), reaching 50 percent only after the BEA’s advance 2008Q3
estimates released at the end of October. Models based on monthly indicators did no better:
an implementation of the Diebold-Rudebusch (1996) monthly indicators model, based on
Kim and Nelson (2000), did not rise above 50 percent until early November 2008, with the
BEA’s release of its initial personal income numbers for September 2008. The behavior of these
models shows that real-time assessments of the state of the business cycle can be meaningfully
improved by looking at GDP(I).
Index, 2006Q1 = 100
GDP(E), March 2008
GDP(I), March 2008



















Figure 6. GDP(E) and GDP(I) Estimates of Different Vintages, 2006Q1–2009Q3
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2008 followed the NBER’s identiﬁcation of December 2007 as a business
cycle peak. All four of the monthly indicators that the NBER uses to date
business cycles had peaked in late 2007 and early 2008, and GDP(I) was
trending down slightly through the first three quarters of 2008 as well.
GDP(E) was the only anomaly, showing continued growth at an annual
rate of almost 2 percent in the ﬁrst half of 2008.
The latest BEA estimates, those of February 2010, also depicted in
figure 6, represent a downward revision of the initial ΔGDP(E) estimates
for 2008 toward the initial ΔGDP(I) estimates, a continuation of the recent
pattern in revisions discussed in section II. Revisions have also reduced
GDP(I), but mainly in the ﬁrst half of 2007. The latest estimates show that
GDP(I) was essentially flat over the four quarters of 2007, declining in
2007Q1 and 2007Q3. These latest estimates suggest that the recent cyclical
downturn caused a measurable deceleration in aggregate output much earlier
than is commonly believed. Meanwhile, the latest estimate of GDP(E)
shows no such early deceleration; instead GDP(E) grew 2.5 percent over
the four quarters of 2007, about the same as in 2006. These differences over
2007 produce the bulk of the enormous swing in the statistical discrepancy
observed in ﬁgure 4, from around −1.9 percent of GDP(E) in late 2006 to
+1.8 percent in 2009Q3.
The current estimates show ΔGDP(E) actually slightly weaker than
ΔGDP(I) in the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008, but the current estimates of
ΔGDP(I) then show a steeper downturn over the worst part of the recession.
The current annualized ΔGDP(I) estimates for 2008Q4 and 2009Q1 are
−7.3 and −7.7 percent, respectively, worse than the ΔGDP(E) estimates of
−5.4 and −6.4 percent.
Finally, the latest ΔGDP(I) estimates for 2009Q3, released in late
February 2010 and incorporating numbers from the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages (see online appendix C), have called into question
the timing of the trough of the recession. Before these numbers were released,
a conventional wisdom was emerging that the recession had likely ended
late in the second quarter of 2009, perhaps in June, with the economy
resuming growth in 2009Q3. Figure 6 shows a modest rebound in GDP(E) in
2009Q3, but no rebound in GDP(I). Personal income less transfer payments
and employment—two of the four indicators most emphasized by the NBER
Business Cycle Dating Committee—continued to decline in 2009Q3.
What is one to make of these important differences between GDP(E) and
GDP(I) over this cycle? All these estimates remain subject to considerable
future revision, but the source data are most concrete for 2007, which
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Currently, two of the components of GDP(I), corporate proﬁts and propri-
etors’ income, incorporate IRS tax returns data through 2007, and declines
in these two income categories account for the bulk of the deceleration in
GDP(I) that year. Nonfarm proprietors’ income (without inventory and
capital consumption adjustments) increased by about $68 billion (nominal)
in 2006 and fell $54 billion in 2007,
12 a deceleration of about $122 billion.
The biggest declines in 2007 were in real estate, construction, and ﬁnance
and insurance, as well as (less explicably) mining (see table 6.12D of the
National Income and Product Accounts). As noted in online appendix C,
some of the decline in proprietors’ income may have represented a decline
in capital gains from house ﬂipping, which should not be included in the
relevant concept of output. Real estate proprietors’ income fell $24 billion
in 2007, but it also fell $14 billion in 2006, suggesting that this type of
mismeasurement cannot explain much of the widening of the statistical
discrepancy in 2007. Construction proprietors’ income decelerated from a
$6 billion increase in 2006 to a $14 billion decline in 2007, with the cur-
rent estimates showing a $46 billion decline in 2008. Part of this decline in
proprietors’ income should probably have shown up in lower spending on
residential improvements, but as discussed earlier and in online appendix C,
the BEA’s averaging of its raw source data will tend to miss such a large
deceleration. Currently, the raw estimates of improvements spending from
the Census show declines of 4 and 14 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively,
steeper than the current BEA estimates of 1 and 4 percent. If the Census
numbers are correct, GDP(E) should be $5 billion lower in 2007 and about
$22 billion lower in 2008, so this also explains only a small portion of the
widening of the statistical discrepancy.
13
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12. The 2007 decline in the raw IRS tax numbers was larger, about $66 billion (see
table 7.14 of the National Income and Product Accounts), but the BEA reduced this ﬁgure
with various adjustments.
13. Some other data sources suggest much larger declines in spending on residential
improvements. For example, Greenspan and Kennedy (2005, 2007) use Flow of Funds data,
and Mian and Sufi (2009) use data from credit rating agencies, to show that households
extracted a very large amount of home equity in the mid-2000s, before banks cut credit lines
in 2007 and 2008 and equity extraction dropped dramatically. Using survey evidence that
households spend about a third of extracted home equity on home improvements—see Brady,
Canner, and Maki (2000), Canner, Dynan and Passmore (2002), and Greenspan and Kennedy
(2007) and the references therein—updated Greenspan-Kennedy estimates give declines in
spending on home improvements of $66 billion in 2007 and $80 billion in 2008. Of course, this
does not necessarily imply causality from equity extraction to spending, because households
may have found other ﬁnancing options when home equity lines of credit dried up.
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$48 billion in 2007—a deceleration of about $230 billion—and the current
estimates for 2008 show a decline of $181 billion. The biggest decline in
proﬁts in 2007 was in the ﬁnance and insurance industry, where a $54 billion
decline in 2007 followed an increase of $4 billion in 2006 and a massive
increase of about $180 billion from 2000 to 2005. Looking more broadly,
the sum of corporate profits, proprietors’ income, and wages and salaries
for the ﬁnance and insurance industry fell by close to 4 percent in 2007, while
PCE for financial services increased by more than 12 percent. Although
the categories are not strictly comparable, these numbers are difficult to
reconcile unless there is severe measurement error in either the income
measures or PCE.
14 In November 2007, in a technical note to its prelim-
inary third-quarter GDP release, the BEA raised the issue of its ability
to strip out capital losses (bad debt expenses and asset write-downs)
from its initial estimates of financial companies’ profits, but the avail-
ability of the tax data for 2007 likely made these subtractions much eas-
ier. The problems now appear more concentrated in the measurement of
financial services PCE and services more generally on the expenditure
side, as discussed in the previous section and in online appendix C.
Given the advent of the financial crisis and the disappearance of many
securitization markets in the second half of 2007, a 12 percent growth
rate for financial services PCE seems implausibly high. To get a sense
of the magnitudes involved, consider that a decline in financial services
PCE of 4 percent would have lowered GDP(E) in 2007 by $76 billion from
its current level, and by more if PCE missed the boom in ﬁnancial services
output over prior years. More recently, proﬁts in the ﬁnance and insurance
industry fell an additional $91 billion in 2008 (with proprietors’ income
and wage and salary income also falling), while financial services PCE
increased once again. Since the tax data have not yet been incorporated
for 2008, some risk remains that the income declines were too steep, but
again it seems implausible that ﬁnancial services PCE continued its uninter-
rupted growth.
Overall, this evidence suggests that although there may be problems on
both sides of the accounts, they are likely more severe on the expenditure
side. Given that, the latest downturn was likely substantially worse than the
current GDP(E) estimates show. Output likely decelerated sooner, fell at a
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mediate input into the production of other industries.
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reﬂected in GDP(E)—and in conventional wisdom.
V. Concluding Thoughts
Considerable evidence suggests that the growth rate of GDP(I) better
captures the business cycle ﬂuctuations in true output growth than does the
growth rate of GDP(E). For the initial growth rate estimates, the revisions
evidence over the past 15 years, the correlations with other business cycle
indicators, and the recent behavior of the estimates around cyclical turning
points all point to this conclusion. For the latest estimates that have passed
through their cycle of revisions, careful consideration of the nature of the
source data, statistical analysis of the information added by the revisions,
and statistical tests, as well as informal comparisons with other business
cycle indicators, again all suggest that GDP(I) growth is better than GDP(E)
growth at tracking ﬂuctuations in true output growth.
These results strongly suggest that economists and statisticians interested
in business cycle fluctuations in U.S. output should pay attention to the
income-side estimates and consider using some sort of weighted average of
the income- and expenditure-side estimates in their analyses. The evidence
in this paper clearly suggests that the weights should be skewed toward
GDP(I), but even a 50–50 average would be a marked improvement over
an estimate that places all its weight on GDP(E). It would also follow the
lead of the Council of Economic Advisers, who, after concluding in the 1997
Economic Report of the President that GDP(I) might be better than GDP(E),
have subsequently given some weight to the income-side estimates in their
productivity analyses: see Economic Report of the President 2008, p. 39,
and Economic Report of the President 2009, pp. 47–48.
The results here also have implications for the BEA. When a new
quarterly estimate of GDP(I) growth becomes available, the evidence here
shows that it is likely to be a better estimate of output growth than the
corresponding GDP(E) estimate. However, the ﬁrst GDP(E) estimate for
any given quarter, the advance estimate, is typically released about a month
before the ﬁrst GDP(I) estimate, and GDP(I) is delayed an additional month
when the BEA is producing estimates for fourth quarters. As noted above,
these delays occur because the BEA has incomplete information on corpo-
rate proﬁts and is not comfortable releasing earlier estimates of proﬁts. In
general, the proﬁts information released by the BEA appears tremendously
useful, and the BEA does have some information on proﬁts at these earlier
release dates. An advance estimate of GDP(I) based on the available proﬁts
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economic growth. Earlier release of the fourth-quarter GDP(I) estimates, so
that an estimate is available at least as early as the BEA’s second release,
might be similarly helpful; the BEA has still not released an estimate of
GDP(I) growth for the fourth quarter of 2009 as of this writing in mid-
March 2010. What the BEA decides will depend on how much information
on proﬁts is really available at these earlier dates, and a thorough assess-
ment of this issue seems in order.
The BEA, the Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics doubt-
less will continue making improvements in their estimates where feasible,
and the good news is that there have been substantial improvements over the
past few years. The data on services have progressed by leaps and bounds,
with the advent of the Census’ Quarterly Services Survey in 2003, the recent
expansions in the coverage of this survey, and the expansions in the cover-
age of the Census’ Service Annual Survey. Further improvements are in
train: in December 2010 the estimates from the Service Annual Survey
will roughly double in coverage, expanding to mimic the sector coverage
of the Economic Census. These data should improve the estimates of PCE
and GDP(E).
Despite these improvements, however, problems with the output growth
estimates will inevitably remain, and lack of coverage of services is only
one of several important limitations of GDP(E). All the results in this paper
suggest that the current reporting practice of the BEA, which puts nearly
exclusive emphasis on GDP(E) over GDP(I), is suboptimal statistically.
The BEA creates tremendous value by producing an income-based estimate
of output growth, but current BEA reporting practice downplays that
estimate so much that many analysts may not even be aware of its existence.
The BEA’s typical press release rarely discusses GDP(I), and it is reported
only toward the back of the release, and then as a nominal level, requiring
analysts to deﬂate and compute annualized quarterly growth rates themselves
to arrive at a number comparable to headline real GDP(E) growth.
If the BEA ﬁnds the results here persuasive, there are several incremental
steps it could take to increasing the prominence of GDP(I). Most obviously,
the BEA could report real annualized growth rates of GDP(I) in its press
releases, preferably in table 1 of the release so they can easily be compared
with the annualized growth rates of real GDP(E). Second, it could give those
annualized growth rates more prominence in the text of the press releases,
discussing them at a level of detail similar to its current discussion of
GDP(E). The BEA’s discussion of the corporate proﬁts estimates could be
rolled into a more general discussion of GDP(I). Third, the BEA could bring
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Steven Landefeld, Eugene Seskin, and Barbara Fraumeni (2008, p. 211)
take a small step in this direction by stating, “what these studies remind
users is that it is useful to look at growth in both GDP and gross domestic
income in assessing the current state of the economy.”
Featuring two measures of output growth in the same press release
would raise communication challenges, and the BEA might fear that such
a practice might prove too confusing for casual analysts.
15 Here the example
of other countries is relevant: the United Kingdom and Australia, for
example, report an average of the two sides of the accounts as their featured
output growth measure. The BEA has considered taking this step in the
past (see, for example, Moulton 2000), and it could report such an average
of GDP(E) and GDP(I) as “GDP(A).”
16 The BEA could employ optimal
weights guided by statistical analysis, as in Fixler and Nalewaik (2007),
but the results here suggest that featuring even a simple 50–50 average
would be a marked improvement over the current practice of featuring
GDP(E) alone.
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15. The BLS does report two estimates of the monthly change in employment in its
employment report, one from the establishment survey and one from the household survey,
but there are clear statistical reasons for favoring the establishment survey number at the
monthly frequency. For the case of GDP(E) and GDP(I), making the case in favor of one
measure over the other is more complicated.
16. Of course, the components of GDP(E) will not sum to the top-line GDP(A), nor will
the components of GDP(I), and this may be confusing for some analysts. But if the evidence
in this paper is convincing, the components of GDP(E) already do not sum to true output or
even to the best estimate of true output; in fact, the sum of the components of GDP(E) misses
important, systematic variation in true output. Reporting an average would simply make these
facts explicit. Over the long run, allocating parts of the discrepancy to different components of
GDP(E) and GDP(I) may be the right thing to do, but this would be an extremely complicated
task, and much research would need to be done beforehand. But if the BEA does attempt to
go down this path at some point, it should do so in a transparent and easily replicable fashion.
The BEA is to be commended for its transparency in reporting the statistical discrepancy and
should do nothing to compromise this transparency.
12178-02a_Nalewaik_rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:10 PM  Page 104References
Abel, Andrew B., and Ben S. Bernanke. 2001. Macroeconomics, 4th ed. Boston:
Addison Wesley.
Brady, Peter J., Glenn B. Canner, and Dean M. Maki. 2000. “The Effects of Recent
Mortgage Reﬁnancing.” Federal Reserve Bulletin (July), pp. 441–50.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2002. “Corporate Profits: Profits before Tax,
Profits Tax Liability, and Dividends.” Methodology Paper. Washington
(September).
———. 2008a. “Updated Summary of NIPA Methodologies.” Survey of Current
Business (November), pp. 8–25.
———. 2008b. “Concepts and Methods of the U.S. National Income and Product
Accounts (Introductory Chapters 1–4).” Washington (July).
Canner, Glenn, Karen Dynan, and Wayne Passmore. 2002. “Mortgage Reﬁnancing
in 2001 and Early 2002.” Federal Reserve Bulletin (December): 469–81.
Diebold, Francis X., and Glenn D. Rudebusch. 1996. “Measuring Business Cycles:
A Modern Perspective.” Review of Economics and Statistics 78, no. 1: 67–77.
Fixler, Dennis, and Bruce Grimm. 2006. “GDP Estimates: Rationality Tests and
Turning Point Performance.” Journal of Productivity Analysis 25: 213–29.
Fixler, Dennis J., and Jeremy J. Nalewaik. 2007. “News, Noise, and Estimates of
the ‘True’ Unobserved State of the Economy.” FEDS Working Paper 2007-34.
Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Fleischman, Charles, and John Roberts. 2010. “A Multivariate Estimate of Trends
and Cycles.” Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
Greenspan, Alan. 2004. “Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy.” American
Economic Review 94, no. 2: 33–40.
Greenspan, Alan, and James Kennedy. 2005. “Estimates of Home Mortgage Orig-
inations, Repayments, and Debt on One-to-Four-Family Residences.” FEDS
Working Paper 2005-41. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
———. 2007. “Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes.” FEDS
Working Paper 2007-20. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Grimm, Bruce T. 2005. “Alternative Measures of U.S. Economic Activity in Business
Cycles and Business Cycle Dating.” BEA Working Paper 2005-05. Washington:
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Landefeld, J. Steven, Eugene P. Seskin, and Barbara M. Fraumeni. 2008. “Taking
the Pulse of the Economy: Measuring GDP.” Journal of Economic Perspectives
22 (Spring): 193–216.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Matthew D. Shapiro. 1986. “News or Noise: An Analysis
of GNP Revisions.” Survey of Current Business (May): 20–25.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David E. Runkle, and Matthew D. Shapiro. 1984. “Are
Preliminary Announcements of the Money Stock Rational Forecasts?” Journal
of Monetary Economics 14, no. 1: 15–27.
JEREMY J. NALEWAIK 105
12178-02a_Nalewaik_rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:10 PM  Page 105Mian, Atif R., and Amir Suﬁ. 2009. “House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing,
and the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis.” Working Paper no. 15283. Cambridge,
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Moulton, Brent R. 2000. “Getting the 21st-Century GDP Right: What’s Underway?”
American Economic Review 90, no. 2: 253–58.
Moylan, Carol E. 2008. “Employee Stock Options and the National Economic
Accounts.” Survey of Current Business (February): 7–13.
Nalewaik, Jeremy J. 2007a. “Estimating Probabilities of Recession in Real Time
Using GDP and GDI.” FEDS Working Paper 2007-07. Washington: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
———. 2007b. “Incorporating Vintage Differences and Forecasts into Markov
Switching Models.” FEDS Working Paper 2007-23. Washington: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
———. 2008. “Lack of Signal Error (LoSE) and Implications for OLS Regres-
sion: Measurement Error for Macro Data.” FEDS Working Paper 2008-15.
Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
106 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
12178-02a_Nalewaik_rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:10 PM  Page 106107
Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
FRANCIS X. DIEBOLD1 The topic of Jeremy Nalewaik’s paper, the
measurement of aggregate output, is of central importance. His case for
preferring GDP(I) to GDP(E) is well argued and in certain key respects
persuasive. Henceforth it will be impossible for macroeconomic analy-
ses to proceed comfortably simply using GDP(E), as if the choice between
GDP(E) and GDP(I) were inconsequential. Exclusive focus on GDP(E)
will require justiﬁcation and may have to be abandoned.
In my view, however, universal prescriptions (which Nalewaik does
not offer, but others might) are unlikely to emerge. Rather, the compara-
tive merits of GDP(E) and GDP(I) depend on the context. That is, use of
one measure or the other will likely produce different answers for some
questions and effectively indistinguishable answers for others. I will sub-
stantiate this claim in two contexts: aggregate output measurement and
business cycle measurement. I will emphasize, moreover, that the important
issue is not which of the two is “better,” but rather how best to combine
them, and what is ultimately added by GDP(I). I will argue that GDP(I)
has much to add for aggregate output measurement, and little to add for
business cycle measurement.
Consider first the choice of measure for aggregate output. This is the
context in which Nalewaik primarily works, and in which, in my view,
his assertions are most persuasive. He argues from a variety of perspec-
tives that GDP(I) may be superior to GDP(E). That is initially surprising—
1. For helpful comments I thank the participants at the Brookings Panel conference,
especially Robert Hall, Christopher Sims, and Justin Wolfers. For research support I thank
the National Science Foundation and the Real-Time Data Research Center at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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must not overinterpret the result. Even if one grants that several argu-
ments favor GDP(I) over GDP(E), one must also recognize that there is
no need to choose one or the other. Instead, there may be gains from com-
bining the two.
Consider forming a combined GDP measure, GDP(C), by taking a
convex combination of GDP(E) and GDP(I):
This is just a “portfolio” of the two measures. Under conditions from the
forecast combination literature (see, for example, Diebold 2007), the opti-
mal portfolio weight λ* is
where ϕ=var(eGDP(E))/var(eGDP(I)), ρ=corr(eGDP(E), eGDP(I)), eGDP(E) = GDP
− GDP(E), and eGDP(I) = GDP − GDP(I). It is natural and desirable that
λ* depend on the variance ratio ϕ=var(eGDP(E))/var(eGDP(I)). In particular, as
var(eGDP(E)) increases relative to var(eGDP(I)), the optimal weight on GDP(E)
drops, other things equal. It is similarly natural that λ* depend on ρ, which
determines the beneﬁts of portfolio diversiﬁcation.
I illustrate the situation in ﬁgure 1, which plots λ* as a function of ϕ, for
various values of ρ. For ϕ=1, the optimal weight on GDP(E) is always 
1⁄2,
and the optimal weight drops toward zero as ϕ increases. The speed with
which it drops, moreover, increases as ρ increases.
2
The key observation is that, except for extreme values of ϕ or ρ, or both,
both GDP(E) and GDP(I) should receive signiﬁcant weight in an informed
assessment of aggregate output. Suppose, for example, that ϕ=1.1, that is,
that var(eGDP(E)) is 10 percent greater than var (eGDP(E)), and that ρ = 0.5, that
is, that eGDP(E) and eGDP(I) are positively correlated, but not overwhelmingly
so). Then the middle panel of the ﬁgure indicates an optimal GDP(E) weight
of λ* = 0.4. Weights near 0 or 1 would require extreme variance ratios,










GDP C GDP E GDP I ( ) = ( ) +− ( ) ( ) λλ 1.
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2. As ρ increases, the gains from diversiﬁcation decrease, and so one diversiﬁes less,
other things equal.
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Figure 1. Optimal Portfolio Weights of GDP(E) and GDP(I) Given the Error Variance


























a. ρ = corr(eGDP(E), eGDP(I));  , ϕ = var(eGDP(E))/var(eGDP(I)), where eGDP(E) = GDP – GDP(E) and








12178-02b_Nalewaik comments_rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:35 PM  Page 109varying, reﬂecting changes in measurement error variances and covariances
(over the business cycle, for example).
Now consider measuring the business cycle, another task of central
importance, as also emphasized in Nalewaik’s paper. A key insight, empha-
sized by Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell (1946) and Robert Lucas
(1977), and clearly reﬂected, for example, in the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research’s business cycle dating methodology, is that the business
cycle is not about any single variable (including GDP). That is, many indi-
cators of business conditions (including GDP) are related to the business
cycle, but no single indicator is the business cycle.
The so-called dynamic factor model embodies the Burns-Mitchell-Lucas
insight and has become a standard tool for empirical characterization of
the business cycle (see, for example, Sargent and Sims 1977, Stock and
Watson 1989, Diebold and Rudebusch 1996, and Aruoba and Diebold
2010). In the dynamic factor framework, one treats the state of the business
cycle as latent, with observed indicators of business conditions provid-
ing noisy signals, and uses the Kalman ﬁlter to produce optimal estimates
of the business cycle from the noisy signals.
Does the choice of GDP(E) or GDP(I) matter for business cycle mea-
surement, which, as I have emphasized, involves monitoring not only GDP
but also a variety of other business conditions indicators? I will address this
question using a ﬁve-variable dynamic factor model nearly identical to that
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia based on payroll employment,
industrial production, personal income less transfers, manufacturing and
trade sales, and GDP (see Aruoba and Diebold 2010 for details).
3
Figure 2 shows the business cycle factor extracted using several versions
of the five-indicator dynamic factor model. The top panel uses GDP(E),
and the middle panel uses GDP(I). The difference is negligible. Evidently,
given the information in the other four indicators, it makes no difference
which estimate of GDP is included as a ﬁfth. Indeed, the bottom panel, based
on a four-variable model that simply excludes GDP, produces a nearly
identical business cycle factor.
To conclude, Nalewaik’s insightful and eye-opening paper deserves sig-
niﬁcant attention. As I have emphasized, however, the relevant question is
not likely to be, “Which of GDP(E) and GDP(I) is better?” or “Which of
GDP(E) and GDP(I) should economists use?” Rather, it is how best to
110 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
3. The Philadelphia Fed model is described at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
data/real-time-center/business-conditions-index/.
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texts, and little in others.
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COMMENT BY
J. STEVEN LANDEFELD
1 Jeremy Nalewaik’s paper is an excellent
piece of research. BEA appreciates work such as this on measurement
issues related to its economic accounts, as well as the opportunity to discuss
it in more detail.
1 External research, complemented by research at BEA, has
long been the source of a wide range of statistical improvements, ranging
from chain indexes to hedonic indexes. Although I have a number of ques-
tions about the conclusions outlined in this paper, it will certainly serve
as the basis for several future research endeavors: first, for further
research on the sources of apparent cyclical patterns in the statistical
discrepancy between GDP and GDI—what Nalewaik refers to as GDP(E)
and GDP(I), respectively; second, for reconciliation with related BEA
work on revisions; third, for further work on the balancing of income, pro-
duction, and expenditure now done in the industry accounts, with partic-
ular attention to their use in balancing annual GDP and GDI estimates;
fourth, for exploration of the means by which BEA can better present
data on GDI and the range of revisions in GDP and GDI estimates without
unduly confusing the general community of users; and, finally, and most
important, for continued work on improving the early source data for both
GDP and GDI to address the measurement issues raised in this paper.
2
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1. These comments reﬂect the very helpful ideas and calculations of my colleagues,
Brent Moulton, Dennis Fixler, Bruce Grimm, and Shaunda Villones.
2. For more information see Fixler and Nalewaik (2009) and Fixler and Grimm
(2002, 2006).
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In general, the conclusion that the gross domestic income measure of
aggregate output is deserving of attention is noncontroversial. The national
accounts have double-entry accounts for purposes not only of providing
multiple estimates of the breakdown of GDP by expenditure and income,
but also of providing a check on the consistency of the two sets of esti-
mates and identifying and correcting sources of discrepancies. As far as I
can determine, BEA has never suggested that GDP is the “true” estimate
of output, or that GDI is not a meaningful and useful measure of eco-
nomic activity.
However, the main conclusion of this paper is that GDI is a better indi-
cator than GDP of economic activity over the business cycle. My own con-
clusions are as follows: First, the evidence suggests that GDP and GDI
provide roughly the same picture of economic activity over the business
cycle and that a review of the source data and performance of the two mea-
sures favors GDP rather than GDI, but both have their strengths and weak-
nesses. Second, any gain in accuracy from averaging the GDI and GDP
estimates is likely to be small. And third, some of the measurement con-
cerns raised in this paper about the ability of GDP and GDI to fully capture
changes in the economy over the business cycle are in the process of being
resolved, thanks to new quarterly source data on services from the Census
Bureau and more comprehensive monthly data on wages and salaries from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Other concerns, especially those related to
the cyclicality of corporate proﬁts and other variables on the income side,
are less tractable and will require further research.
QUALITY OF SOURCE DATA FOR GDP AND GDI. In contrast to the paper’s
assessment, I would describe the source data for the early GDI estimates as
considerably less complete, consistent, and timely than the source data for
the early GDP estimates. As a result, a signiﬁcantly smaller share of the
early estimates for GDP is based on trend extrapolators rather than directly
on source data. Moreover, BEA views the GDP source data as generally
superior to the GDI source data, because they are collected for statistical
purposes and based on a consistent set of survey deﬁnitions designed to be
used with the national accounts. They are collected by the Census Bureau
as part of a consistent set of business surveys using the same universe and
samples to collect monthly, quarterly, annual, and comprehensive (once
every ﬁve years) data. In contrast, the source data for the GDI estimates are
mainly taken from financial statements or collected by a variety of regu-
latory and tax agencies for nonstatistical purposes. These “administrative”
data utilize a wide range of concepts and deﬁnitions, many of which differ
signiﬁcantly from those used in the national accounts. They also differ in
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for proﬁts, proprietors’ income, rental income, and interest income—differ
significantly over time because of changes in business accounting and
tax rules, changes in business practices, and changes in business condi-
tions. The estimates from these sources also vary for the same time period,
raising concerns about the consistency of estimates compiled from a
combination of these sources. (For example, BEA’s initial corporate
profits estimates are based on companies’ financial reports and financial
accounting rules, whereas the latest estimates are based on companies’
tax reports and IRS accounting rules.) Finally, significant tax incentives
and corporate reporting requirements can bias information based on busi-
ness, financial, and tax records. BEA takes great pains to adjust these
administrative data to provide information consistent with the national
accounts in terms of definition, scope, and timing, but such adjustments
are challenging.
Whereas 86 percent of the early GDP estimates is based on some form of
direct monthly or quarterly source data, only 37 percent of the early GDI
estimates is based on such data; the rest is based on ratio adjustments, judg-
ment, or trend estimators. The largest extrapolations are for the following:
nonwage compensation, or supplements, which account for 18 percent of
compensation and 10 percent of GDI; wages and salaries for nonproduction
and supervisory workers, which include irregular payments and account
for 45 percent of compensation and 21 percent of GDI; interest expense
and rental income, which account for 8 percent of GDI; and proprietors’
income, which includes large adjustments for misreporting and accounts for
8 percent of GDI (table 1).
3
For the major components of GDI, revisions to later vintages of the esti-
mates are sometimes signiﬁcant. For example, the initial estimates of total
wages and salaries have been subject to signiﬁcant revision when the quar-
terly administrative (payroll tax) data become available in the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). These revisions reﬂect the
fact that although production and nonsupervisory workers account for
roughly two-thirds of employment, they account for only a little more than
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3. The 13 percent of the third estimates of GDP that is trend based is mainly in service
components of personal consumption expenditures, including “other” services, “other”
transportation, medical services, recreation, personal care, other personal business services,
education and research, and religious and welfare services—as well as “other” state and
local expenditures.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12178-02b_Nalewaik comments_rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:12 PM  Page 115half of wages and salaries, and the fact that the payroll survey does not
capture stock options, bonuses, and other irregular payments.
4
Further, although the QCEW data, which are available 4 months after the
advance GDP report, cover virtually all workers, they are quite volatile and
have proved to be extremely difﬁcult to measure on a seasonally adjusted
basis. Moreover, once annual QCEW data are received, there can be signif-
icant revisions in the quarterly data.
Corporate proﬁts are even more difﬁcult to measure, and early estimates
based on corporate ﬁnancial statements can differ signiﬁcantly from both
the economic accounting measure from BEA and the tax-based measure
from the IRS. According to BEA’s revision studies, corporate proﬁts have
the largest mean absolute revision of any component of GDP or GDI,
except for farm proprietors’ income.
The large revisions to proﬁts reﬂect a number of factors, including the
large differences between ﬁnancial and tax accounting rules and BEA’s eco-
nomic accounting conventions; the use of ﬁnancial corporate data for public
companies to extrapolate proﬁts for private or S corporations; and the possi-
ble effects of capital gains and losses or “unusual” losses—which should
be excluded from GDI—in the source data for proﬁts. And the ﬁnal proﬁts
numbers differ widely depending on the source of the data. For 2005, proﬁts
as reported in the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) increased by 43 percent,
S&P operating proﬁts by 9 percent, and Census Bureau Quarterly Finan-
cial Report proﬁts by 15 percent. The mean absolute difference between the
highest and the lowest estimate of growth in profits from 1999 to 2007
was 23 percentage points, with the largest differences recorded in 2001.
Although many of these differences are relatively easily resolved, many
others, such as those surrounding major changes in the economy, changes in
accounting rules and practices, or changes in tax law, can be quite difﬁcult.
The GDP estimates are, of course, not without their own limitations.
As Nalewaik points out, one of the most important has been the absence
of a timely, comprehensive data source for services in the early GDP esti-
mates. Extrapolators for services may well have contributed to the ten-
dency of the early GDP estimates to understate the decline in GDP during
116 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
4. Beginning with the ﬁrst quarter of 2010, BEA estimates of wages and salaries reﬂect
newly available monthly tabulations of hours and earnings for all employees on private non-
farm payrolls from the BLS’s expanded current employment statistics program. However,
the new BLS monthly data do not include certain types of irregular pay, such as bonuses and
stock options, which are included in the QCEW data.
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and Grimm 2002).
5
One of the important advantages of the GDP estimates is that source
data (mainly Census data) are quite timely: only about 25 percent of
GDP is estimated using trend-based data for the ﬁrst (or, as BEA calls it,
the advance) estimate of GDP. That estimate is available approximately
1 month (25 days) after the end of the quarter, whereas sufﬁcient source
data for the ﬁrst GDI estimate are not available until 2 months after the end
of the quarter (3 months in the case of the fourth quarter). Also, the share
of trend-based data for the ﬁrst estimate of GDI is 63 percent, signiﬁcantly
higher than even the third GDI estimate.
However, the most important advantage of the GDP source data is the
ability to develop an integrated benchmark for the GDP estimates once
every 5 years based on detailed, high-quality data from the Economic Cen-
sus. Equally important, the monthly and quarterly Census Bureau data are
conceptually consistent with the deﬁnitions used by the Census Bureau for
their every-5-year benchmark and annual data. Although this consistency
does not provide clear evidence that GDP is closer to “true” production, for
many users the conceptual consistency of the monthly, quarterly, annual,
and every-5-year Economic Census data is a major source of comfort.
THE CYCLICALITY OF THE LATEST ESTIMATES. Nalewaik’s conclusions on the
superiority of GDI rest mainly on his reading of the source data. As sug-
gested above, a careful and detailed analysis suggests that the source data
for the early GDI estimates are signiﬁcantly weaker than those for the early
GDP estimates. Nalewaik argues that the benchmarking procedures and
the extrapolation of services make the GDP estimates too smooth, but he
discounts the likelihood that the failure to fully remove capital gains and
losses makes GDI too cyclical. Yet ﬁrms do seem to have the ability to
time their receipts, expenses, and recognition of unusual losses in ways
that would overstate the cyclicality of recorded profits relative to under-
lying economic activity. Firms may tend, for example, to recognize unusual
losses when the overall economy and competing ﬁrms’ sales and proﬁts
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5. As a result of a multiyear Census Bureau initiative to expand its services surveys,
through new quarterly and expanded services, BEA is making substantial progress in
improving the GDP source data for services. The Census Bureau’s plans call for complet-
ing its program to provide complete coverage in the quarterly and annual services 
surveys by 2012.
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ceptions and stock prices.
It is also known that quarterly wage data have included capital gains
in the form of stock options, which were not taken out until the annual
revisions, when profits data that excluded them were available. It also
seems plausible that the misreporting adjustment that BEA applies to
IRS data is countercyclical, yet BEA’s misreporting adjustment is pro-
portional and varies little over time, implying that measured income
would be too cyclical.
Nonetheless, there is probably something to both sides of the argument
over the cyclicality of GDP and GDI. Indeed, to address the issue, BEA is
taking steps, outlined below, to improve the accuracy of services estimates
through the incorporation of new quarterly services data in GDP, and to
improve the early wage and salary estimates in GDI. Corporate proﬁts will
remain an issue, but this work by Nalewaik on the cyclicality of the statis-
tical discrepancy suggests directions for future research.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF GDI AND GDP TO COINCIDENT MEASURES OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY. Nalewaik shows that the cyclical measures that he examines
move more closely in tandem with GDI than with GDP. Part of that closer
correspondence relates to his use of income-type variables that either are
used to measure GDI or can be seen as proxies for income-side measures
of GDP. An examination of a broader set of cyclical measures, such as
retail sales and manufacturing sales, shows that GDP has a closer corre-
lation over 1984–2009 with these variables than does GDI. This partly
reﬂects the fact that these variables either are used to measure GDP or can
be seen as proxies for product-side measures of GDP. Moreover, an exam-
ination of nine business cycle measures—nonfarm employment, private
services payroll, manufacturing employment, nonmanufacturing employ-
ment, personal income less transfers, industrial production, manufacturing
sales, retail sales, and the nonmanufacturing ISM index—shows that their
correlations with GDP and GDI are very similar, with only a slightly larger
correlation for one or the other.
6 The average correlation of these variables
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6. The correlations are as follows: nonfarm employment with GDP, 0.73, with GDI,
0.77; private services payroll with GDP, 0.69, with GDI, 0.73; manufacturing employment
with GDP, 0.68, with GDI, 0.74; nonmanufacturing employment with GDP, 0.68, with GDI,
0.67; personal income less transfers with GDP, 0.65, with GDI, 0.76; industrial production
with GDP, 0.50, with GDI, 0.60; manufacturing sales with GDP, 0.75, with GDI, 0.69; retail
sales with GDP, 0.65, with GDI, 0.57; nonmanufacturing ISI index with GDP, 0.57, with
GDI, 0.66.
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with GDP was 0.66, compared with 0.69 for GDI, even though ﬁve of the
nine variables are income-type variables.
I have not examined the leading index indicators discussed by Nalewaik
because they do not seem to be a meaningful measure of the accuracy of
either GDP or GDI. Stock prices, the yield curve, and high-yield bond
spreads are not, as Nalewaik notes, measures of economic activity but
rather leading indicators that are used to try to predict economic activity. As
the former custodian of the leading indicators—which have been described
as measurement without theory—I can report that they have a less-than-
stellar history of predicting GDP and the business cycle, especially when
examined in real time. The S&P 500 index, for example, may be a good
ﬁnancial indicator, but it has a checkered history as a leading economic
indicator.
ACCURACY OF THE GDP AND GDI ESTIMATES IN 1984–2006. My review of
most of the evidence marshaled by Nalewaik and a review of the current
(rather than the revised, or latest) estimates from BEA suggest similar trend
growth and cyclical patterns for the GDP and GDI estimates in 1984–2006.
Both GDP and GDI provide very similar estimates of trend growth. Look-
ing at revisions to the GDP and GDI estimates at the time of the compre-
hensive benchmarks—which are based on the Economic Censuses of 1982,
1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002—one can see that nominal GDP and GDI were
revised by an average of 1 to 2 percent, and the growth rates for those 
5-year periods were revised by about one-quarter of 1 percentage point.
A number of revision studies have shown that GDP and GDI estimates
are both reliable indicators of general economic activity, as defined by
whether growth is fast or slow relative to trend, whether growth is acceler-
ating or decelerating, which of the major components are contributing to
growth, and trends in saving and other major components of GDP. Dennis
Fixler and Nalewaik (2009) have found that the revisions are larger around
turning points, and given the degree of extrapolation in both the GDP and the
GDI estimates, this makes sense. However, as I show in ﬁgures 1 and 2, the
general patterns exhibited by the early estimates of both GDP and GDI
are quite similar. In the last three business cycles, both early estimates show
roughly the same peak, slowing pattern, trough, and recovery pattern. Most
of Nalewaik’s ﬁgures look at the differences in the revised GDP and GDI
data, and except for 2007, the revised, or latest, data also show the same
general cyclical patterns for GDP and GDI (ﬁgure 3).
ACCURACY OF THE GDP AND GDI ESTIMATES OVER 2007–09. The estimates of
GDI and GDP for 2007–09 show a much larger cumulative drop in GDI
than in GDP: GDI declined 4.1 percent from the fourth quarter of 2006 to
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Figure 2. Changes in Real GDI and GDP, Third-Release Estimates, 1999–2003
a
Figure 1. Changes in Real GDI and GDP, Latest-Release Estimates, 1984–2009a
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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the second quarter of 2009 (the trough in both GDP and GDI), while GDP
declined 1.2 percent. Almost all of the cumulative difference occurs in
2007; between the relative peak in the fourth quarter of 2007 and the
second quarter of 2009, the declines in GDP and GDI were much closer,
with GDP declining 3.7 percent and GDI 4.1 percent.
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in 2007, with quarters of sharply lower and even negative growth, the latest
estimates show GDI increasing only 0.1 percent over the four quarters of
2007, while GDP increased 2.5 percent. The main source of the slowdown
in GDI comes from proﬁts and proprietors’ income, both of which declined
in 2007. During 2007, compensation, including wages and salaries, contin-
ued to grow. This growth in compensation in GDI seems consistent with the
2.5 percent growth in GDP, which in turn seems consistent with the 0.8 per-
cent growth in employment. Also, the residual growth in productivity
(as measured by GDP per employee) of about 1.7 percent does not seem so
high as to suggest that GDP growth was overestimated relative to employ-
ment (average productivity growth since 1995 averaged 2.5 percent).
The difference between the GDP and GDI estimates for 2007 (and early
2008) seems to turn on the accuracy of the proﬁts and proprietors’ income
data. As discussed above, converting IRS data and ﬁnancial report data to
a national income and product accounts basis is extremely difﬁcult, espe-
cially during periods of rapid change in markets. Firms have the ability to
adjust the timing of their expenses and receipts and when they recognize
unusual gains and losses. Tax law changes and changes in the economy can
also affect the consistency of proﬁts over time. The year 2007 marked the
beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis, and although BEA does its best to exclude
unusual gains and losses, proﬁt estimates for banks and other ﬁnancial insti-
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Figure 3. Changes in Real GDI and GDP, Third-Release Estimates, 2006–09a
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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ing proprietors’ income is challenging as well. IRS studies suggest that
for each dollar reported to the IRS, another dollar is not reported. BEA
therefore roughly doubles the annual estimate reported by the IRS. Unfor-
tunately, only two comprehensive IRS estimates of underreporting have
been published in the last 25 years: the 1988 IRS Taxpayer Compliance
Measurement Program and the 2001 IRS National Research Program. So
BEA’s doubling may capture the long-run trend in compliance, but it may
not be appropriate at times of signiﬁcant change in the economy, and as
noted above, it may cause measured income to be too cyclical.
It is also worth noting that the National Bureau of Economic Research,
using data on employment, sales, and a number of other cyclical indicators
including GDP, placed the cyclical peak in December 2007. This cyclical
dating then counts most of 2007 as a period of expansion, which is consistent
with growth in GDP, but not with the ﬂat-to-declining pattern of GDI.
Overall, my reading of the behavior of the GDP and GDI data for 2007
and early 2008 suggests that GDP looks more consistent with the behavior
of employment and unemployment than GDI. However, both sets of esti-
mates will see further revisions, so interested readers should stay tuned.
SHOULD WE AVERAGE GDP AND GDI? Averaging GDP and GDI, using the
two-to-one weighting recommended by Nalewaik, should produce an esti-
mate of output that changes less in subsequent annual revisions than GDP
has in recent years, but the statistical gain would not be large, on average,
relative to the average revision. Moreover, the value of averaging must be
weighed against two disadvantages: ﬁrst, that of having larger revisions
between the advance and the second estimate (when the income data are
introduced), and second, the risk of having anomalous revisions that could
reduce conﬁdence in the overall accuracy of the national accounts.
Although the use of GDI and other real-time data may be able to reduce
revisions to the early output estimates, the relative gain is likely to be
small. Based on the estimates in the paper, the use of GDI over 1994–2006
would have reduced the mean absolute revision in the early GDP estimate
by 0.2 percentage point, but the mean absolute revision to GDP over this
period was 1.25 percentage points.
7 That is not insigniﬁcant, but the rela-
tive size, along with the fact that the early GDI and GDP estimates present
a similar picture of the business cycle, needs to be considered in any pro-
posal to produce a weighted average. Also, users of economic data may
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7. Based on a replication of Nalewaik’s equation, the mean absolute revision in
1994–2006 to GDP would be reduced from 1.25 to 1.18 percentage points.
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with the growth in the subcomponents for either GDP or GDI.
In the past, BEA has presented the idea of averaging the estimates to its
key users. BEA’s Advisory Committee, the Federal Reserve Board, and
other users of the national accounts have consistently told us that if we want
to balance GDP and GDI, we should continue to publish separate estimates
of both, along with the statistical discrepancy, and then produce a balanced
set of accounts that allocate the discrepancy using a replicable, statistically
based method. BEA has been working on a methodology for balancing the
input-output and industry accounts, but we do not think it is feasible to
develop balanced quarterly GDP and GDI accounts. However, BEA will
explore means of better presenting and highlighting the GDP and GDI esti-
mates in ways that meet the differing needs of the various users.
BEA will also continue to work with the BLS, the Census Bureau, and
the IRS to improve the source data for both GDI and GDP. Incorporation
of the next steps in the expansion of the quarterly services survey should
continue to bring significant improvement in the source data for GDP.
Recent efforts by the BLS to collect data on all types of income—including
bonuses, stock options, and other irregular payments—were unsuccessful,
but the recent incorporation of the new BLS data on wages and salaries for
all workers should signiﬁcantly improve the estimates of wages in GDI.
Finally, legislation now in prospect that would allow BEA, the BLS, and the
Census Bureau more consistent access to tax data could be very helpful in
reconciling the large differences between ﬁnancial and tax accounting data.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Christopher Sims asserted that the relevant issue
is whether GDP(I) or GDP(E) is better by itself as an indicator, and not
whether putting GDP(I) or GDP(E) into a factor model makes a difference
in the outcome, as Francis Diebold had sought to demonstrate. If GDP(E)
were simply GDP(I) plus noise, then the result would be the same, because
Diebold is extracting the nonnoise part of GDP(I) and GDP(E). Sims
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does most of the work in the factor model. Traditional aggregates, which
are in a sense informal factors, can come close to extracting the main busi-
ness cycle factor. It would be interesting to test a bivariate factor model to
see whether an underlying factor in both GDP(I) and GDP(E) is closer to
one or the other, and to ask how close GDP(I) or GDP(E) comes by itself.
Francis Diebold responded that one could indeed treat GDP(E) and GDP(I)
as indicators and extract a factor from them, but that that is a different
exercise, in no way superior to or more appropriate than the results he had
reported, which answer different but equally important questions.
Robert Hall noted that the press release from the NBER Business Cycle
Dating Committee announcing its determination of the December 2007
business cycle peak said speciﬁcally that the committee consulted real gross
domestic income. Clearly its usefulness is not news to the committee. The
committee also rejected an approach to deﬁning real activity that mixes a
number of indicators together, because the mix always overweights manu-
facturing. As the manufacturing share of GDP has declined, it is important
to avoid what would become substantial double counting. Hall further
reported that the notional set of indicators that the committee listed does
not reveal the weights the committee applies. The committee is focused
on ﬁnding two things: the best possible measures of output and aggregate
employment. The committee looks at the modern economy mainly with
economy-wide, not sectoral, measures.
Hall found the paper persuasive on the point that the best early estimate
of output ought to use a lot of highly relevant variables. The quality of the
early estimates of both GDP(E) and GDP(I) could be improved by giving
weight to private forecasts as well as the early data available to the BEA.
Because the government might be squeamish about releasing an output
estimate that relies mainly on forecasts and correlations, the BEA ought to
consider leaving the close-to-real-time estimates—the nowcasting—to
others. At a minimum, users of the BEA’s early estimates should be con-
sulting private nowcasts as well.
Phillip Swagel thought the paper raised a basic question about the very
nature of a recession. Consider the debate over unemployment versus out-
put measures: if real GDP growth were 1 percent for a considerable period,
there would surely be net job losses. Would that be a recession, or not? The
question is, What does one hinge the start and end dates on: measures of
output or measures of the labor market?
Matthew Shapiro seconded Sims’s comment that it would be useful to
have the bivariate factor model calculate the optimal portfolio weights of
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because it assumes that all the variance is error. If most of the variance
were signal, the results might be quite different. The right weights will
depend on the relative amounts of signal and noise in the two data series.
Philip Howrey had done something similar 20 years ago, attempting to
assign weights to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ household and establish-
ment surveys. His analysis put about 80 percent of the weight on the estab-
lishment survey, which has now become the conventional wisdom.
Jan Hatzius noted that before the BEA reported estimates of GDP(E)
and GDP(I) for the fourth quarter of 2009, the Federal Reserve’s Flow
of Funds tables already included an estimate of the fourth-quarter statis-
tical discrepancy between the two, which shows an increase of about
$130 billion over the previous quarter. That implies an estimate of real
GDP(I) growth for the fourth quarter of just over 2 percent annualized.
Hatzius was curious about how much, if any, weight should be put on
that. He also observed that many analysts are concerned at the moment
about the deviation between the performance of large firms and that 
of small firms, and what that might mean for preliminary estimates 
of GDP. Which of the two GDP measures is more vulnerable to that
deviation? Finally, Hatzius wondered why other countries put more
weight on income-based measures. Is it because they have different data
sources, with different strengths and weaknesses than their U.S. counter-
parts, or do they simply reach a different conclusion about how impor-
tant it is not to confuse the public, for example by taking an average of
different measures?
Robert Gordon did not accept the characterization of the debate over
output versus employment in the business cycle dating context as a tug-of-
war between proponents of one or the other. Rather, he saw it as an econo-
metric problem, one that involved studying the breakdown of changes in
output and the output gap into their components, starting from the simple
identity that output is equal to aggregate hours times output per aggregate
hour, that is, aggregate productivity.
Gordon also acknowledged that the Okun’s law relationship is quite dif-
ferent today from what it was in the mid-1980s, with unemployment
becoming much more responsive to output than in the original formula-
tion. Whereas in Okun’s day aggregate hours responded by two-thirds of
any movement in the output gap, today hours respond more than one for
one. Further, the Great Recession witnessed departures from this relation-
ship, with productivity growing faster and hours falling further than even
the post-1986 equation would have predicted.
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behavior of real GDP(I) and GDP(E) estimates over the most recent reces-
sion, reduces the residuals. In fact, the erroneous division of the equation
between productivity and hours is almost eliminated. But this happened
before the recession started; it is mainly a story about 2007. Gordon found
it reassuring to have at least a partial explanation of why productivity had
looked so good in the last 2 years.
Benjamin Friedman encouraged making a sharper distinction between
two conceptual questions. The ﬁrst is whether output or employment is the
more meaningful concept for judging turns in business cycles. The second
is which of the two statistics, GDP(E) or GDP(I), does a better job of
measuring what we understand by output. The second question arises only
because the statistical agencies use double-entry bookkeeping, which in a
world of imperfect measurement necessarily leads to discrepancies. Even
in a world of perfect measurement, where GDP(I) and GDP(E) are always
identical, the ﬁrst issue would still be a question, but the issue addressed by
the paper would go away.
Friedman noted that the paper showed a very strong historical correla-
tion between the statistical discrepancy between the two output measures
and unemployment, which suggests that the question of what is going
either unmeasured or mismeasured that gives rise to the difference is not
just about, for example, the superiority of one or another source of data, but
rather involves substantive questions of economics. He encouraged further
analysis of what these measurement problems are. One might think the dis-
crepancy is just noise, but the correlation he cited shows that it is not pure
noise. Steven Davis added that the correlation suggests that the discrepancy
is cyclically varying, which implies that determining the optimal weights
for an average is more complicated.
Davis also remarked on Steven Landefeld’s discussion of the administra-
tive record inputs to the GDP(I) side, each of which is somewhat different
in scope. Recognizing that making adjustments for these differences is chal-
lenging, he hoped that the BEA would drill down deeper and investigate the
extent to which these administrative data sources line up when the discrep-
ancies are more fully taken into account. There are potentially tremendous
advantages to relying on administrative records when possible; their com-
prehensive nature creates much greater opportunities for disaggregation by
type of activity, location, and other dimensions.
Steven Braun complimented the BEA for showing its dirty laundry, in
the sense of making its best estimates of both GDP(E) and GDP(I) available
so that economists could analyze the statistical discrepancy. Oral tradition
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statistical discrepancy and did not allow it to change very much. Braun also
said that what he would most like to see changed in the federal statistical
system was not anything that the BEA does, but rather the way the BLS
publishes its productivity data, preferring that the numerator for the produc-
tivity calculation be a weighted average of the two output measures.
Justin Wolfers expressed concern about Diebold’s approach, on the
grounds that the usefulness of any data is in what they reveal about the
underlying real factor. When looking for the causes of the current reces-
sion, it matters for the diagnosis whether it appears that labor productivity
was growing or falling. As Braun had argued, it is a question of getting the
numerator right, and it has real economic signiﬁcance.
Wolfers went on to make a plea for Landefeld to give the paper another
chance. He thought the concern over users being confused by an average
of GDP(E) and GDP(I) was overblown: sophisticated users are already
taking an average. Moreover, when the choice is framed as one measure or
the other, it is all too easy to regard whichever choice the administration’s
economists make as political. In any case, if the BEA is determined to rely
on only one measure, all the metrics in the paper except one say it should
be the income-based measure.
Alan Blinder observed that the paper shows that the GDP(E) revision,
which previously had been thought not to be forecastable, is in fact fore-
castable by GDP(I). This alone, in his view, was a sufﬁcient reason for the
BEA to use it.
Steven Landefeld, responding to some of the concerns raised, noted that
Europe uses GDP(I), probably for lack of the kind of sources available in
the United States for expenditure-side data. Europe is now in the process
of developing a set of monthly indicators for sales and output. He also
commented that the gain in accuracy from “nowcasting” is relatively
small. It does not dramatically change things. With respect to averaging,
what some users, including many members of the BEA’s advisory com-
mittee, have requested is, rather than a simple average, a statistical
methodology that shares it out to components, creating a consistent pic-
ture. The BEA is working on something similar in its industry accounts.
Landefeld added that from his experience as the custodian of the index of
leading indicators and previous research, he did not expect to ﬁnd the use of
cyclical indicators very helpful in improving the accuracy of GDP(E) or
GDP(I), but that the BEA would continue to research and attempt to address
the sources of the statistical discrepancy over the business cycle. He also
noted that the BEA intended to better highlight GDP(I) in its reports.
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